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Abstract. This paper focuses on the defection of nuclear physicist Bruno Pontecorvo from
Britain to the USSR in 1950 in an attempt to understand how government and intelligence
services assess threats deriving from the unwanted spread of secret scientiﬁc information. It
questions whether contingent agendas play a role in these assessments, as new evidence
suggests that this is exactly what happened in the Pontecorvo case. British diplomatic per-
sonnel involved in negotiations with their US counterparts considered playing down the case.
Meanwhile, the press decided to play it up, claiming that Pontecorvo was an atom spy. Finally,
the British secret services had evidence showing that this was a fabrication, but they did not
disclose it. If all these manipulations served various purposes, then they certainly were not
aimed at assessing if there was a threat and what this threat really was.
Mr. George Strauss, Minister of Supply, stated in the House of Commons yesterday that he
had no information about the present whereabouts of Professor Bruno Pontecorvo, the atomic
scientist, apart from what had appeared in the press. Questioned about the professor’s ‘ loy-
alty’, he said: ‘We would like to wait for a few days.’ He could not say that the professor had
not been able to gather valuable information, but for some time he had had only ‘ limited’
access to secrets.
The Manchester Guardian, 24 October 1950
Since the beginning of the nuclear age the fear that nuclear knowledge may fall into the
wrong hands has run in parallel with the development of nuclear science. Those states,
like Britain, that possess atomic knowledge feel obliged to control it in order to prevent
nations eager to harness weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from doing so. During
the Cold War and after, government agencies have regularly investigated whether
atomic secrets crossed Britain’s borders to reach ‘enemy’ countries. Praising the work
of intelligence agencies, governments have often claimed that evidence on possible
threats is quickly gathered and used to make precise assessments on risks deriving from
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the spread of nuclear information.1 Those assessments are very important tools not only
in the resolution of international controversies, but also in the establishment of atomic
security in Britain, where activities carried out in universities and research centres are
monitored and regulated by laws.2
Many issues related to nuclear science and technology are not as easy to assess as one
may believe. In recent years, historians and sociologists of science have pointed out that
in nuclear physics similar means can be used for peaceful purposes or to harness WMD.
Nuclear science and technology is multifaceted in several ways. First, the nuclear ma-
terials can be used as fuel in nuclear reactors to produce energy or in nuclear devices as
an explosive.3 Second, instrumentation for the measurement of radioactivity has a
variety of applications within pure and applied nuclear research.4 Finally, nuclear ex-
perts know how to shift nuclear knowledge from the domain of pure research or energy
research to weapons research. Their tacit knowledge plays a crucial role in this trans-
fer.5 So the multifaceted character of nuclear science and technology may represent an
obstacle to assessments put forward. Moreover, it is disputable whether government
and intelligence agencies make their assessments solely with reference to gathered
scientiﬁc evidence, as political or diplomatic agendas may drive their actions. Thus
deﬁning what represents a threat in relation to atomic issues may be negotiated within
the ‘corridors of power’ before becoming a subject of public discussion.
These issues, which are certainly at the heart of contemporary British home and
foreign policy, also have a historical resonance with the well-known ‘atom spy cases ’ of
the 1950s. In the post-war years, the fear that the Soviet Union was harnessing WMD
prompted intelligence work. The investigations led to the discovery that the Soviet
Union had used Western scientists to gain access to atomic secrets. In 1946 this led
to the incrimination of British physicist Allan Nunn May. In January 1950 further
investigation led to the arrest of German e´migre´ physicist Klaus Fuchs. In July 1950
American chemist Harry Gold and army sergeant David Greenglass confessed their
1 For example the recent ‘ Iraq’s WMD. The assessment of the British Government’, 24–7, at
www.pm.gov.uk, accessed 10 October 2002. This essay was written before the conﬂict in Iraq, thus it does not
take into account later criticism of the assessment of the British government put forward by MPs, media or
other academics.
2 The Export Control Bill (2002) gives the government the power to veto the transfer of ideas abroad,
license foreign researchers working in Britain and stop the publication of research ﬁndings. This was approved
following the Scott report on the 1996 Iraq arms scandal that considered British security measures over science
too lax. P. Curtis, ‘Export Bill changes secure academic freedom’, The Guardian, 23 July 2002.
3 M. Walker, ‘Legends surrounding the German atomic bomb’, in Science, Medicine and Cultural Im-
perialism (ed. T. Meade and M. Walker), London, 1991, 181. In nuclear technology, raw materials such as
uranium (U238) and thorium (Th232) are used in the production of ﬁssile materials. U238 is used to produce
enriched uranium (U235) or plutonium (Pu239), while thorium is used to produce another ﬁssile isotope of
uranium (U233). The ﬁssile materials U235 and Pu239 can be used (and have been used in the past) as fuels in
nuclear reactors or explosives in nuclear weapons. See I. Ursu, Physics and Technology of Nuclear Materials,
Oxford, 1985, Chapter 3.
4 For example, Peter Galison argues that in the post-war years ‘ instruments like [the counters] were among
the bonds connecting weapons work with post-war basic research’. P. Galison, Image & Logic: A Material
Culture of Microphysics, Chicago, 1997, 296.
5 D. MacKenzie and G. Spinardi, ‘Tacit knowledge and the uninvention of nuclear weapons’, American
Journal of Sociology (1995), 101, 44–99.
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espionage activity in the US. This led to the indictment of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg,
both condemned to death and executed. On the whole, the witch-hunts prompted
accusations of scientiﬁc treachery, while the cases were used to foster anti-communist
propaganda.6
Ironically, this was not the case for Bruno Pontecorvo, whose probable defection to
the USSR was announced on 21 October 1950. British newspapers reported that
Pontecorvo had mysteriously disappeared in Finland while returning to Britain from a
holiday resort in the Mediterranean. Born in Italy but now having British citizenship,
Pontecorvo was a scientist at the UK’s Atomic Energy Research Establishment (AERE)
based in Harwell (Berkshire). A former pupil of Nobel Prize-winner Enrico Fermi, he
had previously worked at the Chalk River nuclear research station in Canada as part of
the Manhattan Project. Yet the British government’s reaction to Pontecorvo’s disap-
pearance was extraordinarily understated. In two parliamentary brieﬁngs, the Minister
of Supply George Strauss claimed that Pontecorvo’s contact with secret work was very
limited because in recent years he had been mainly involved in cosmic ray research. But
was Strauss telling the whole story?
The questions ‘what is really secret in the atomic secrets? ’ and ‘how do governments
assess the threats deriving from the spread of nuclear information?’ are the focus of this
paper, which explores Bruno Pontecorvo’s career and the episode of his defection to the
USSR. Exploiting archival material recently made available to the public, I reconsider
these issues in the light of the Pontecorvo case.7 The episode turns out to be much more
interesting than the existing literature suggests. Pontecorvo made crucial contributions
to the British nuclear programme. His expertise was used in the design of nuclear piles
and the manufacture of instrumentation for the detection of natural radioactive de-
posits. Both these research areas were considered secret because the success of any
nuclear weapons programme depended upon harnessing natural uranium and trans-
forming it into ﬁssile material within nuclear piles.
Following Pontecorvo’s defection, the Deputy Director of the UK Atomic Energy
Department, Michael Perrin, assessed the case on behalf of the British government. He
was advised to minimize its impact in relation to negotiations on nuclear matters be-
tween Britain, Canada and the US. Thus he claimed that Pontecorvo had had very
limited access to secret research.8 By contrast, Pontecorvo was depicted as an atom spy
by the press. The British security service MI5 knew that the allegation was not
supported by evidence, but in view of agreements with the FBI, the British intelligence
6 On Klaus Fuchs see R. C. Williams, Klaus Fuchs: Atom Spy, Cambridge, MA, 1987. On the Rosenbergs
see M. Garber and R. L. Walkowitz (eds.), Secret Agents: The Rosenberg Case, McCarthysm, and Fifties
America, New York, 1995.
7 These include 1. Pontecorvo’s scientiﬁc reports in the AB series at the Public Records Oﬃce (PRO),
London; 2. Diplomatic correspondence on the Pontecorvo Case in the series FO, CAB, at the PRO;
3. B. Pontecorvo and J. Chadwick correspondence in the collections PNVO and CHAD at Churchill College
Archive, Cambridge.
8 If Perrin’s action was due to a contingent agenda, it was also shaped in the context of a ‘culture of
secrecy’. As shown by historian David Vincent, this culture was a very important aspect of British policy in
the post-war years. D. Vincent, The Culture of Secrecy: Britain, 1832–1998, Oxford, 1998, 186–247.
Nuclear science, politics and security in the Pontecorvo case 391
agency did not dismiss the claim.9 In turn the media campaign that followed
Pontecorvo’s defection promoted the reformation of atomic security and fostered the
introduction of tighter measures of control at government laboratories, including the
infamous ‘positive vetting’. The construction of Pontecorvo’s image as an ‘atom spy’
therefore served various political, security and media agendas.
In the last ﬁfty years, public opinion and the ‘received’ version of events have been
shaped by accounts manipulated both by diplomatic and intelligence agencies. The
‘gap’ between what the public knew about Pontecorvo and what was known by
just a few has led also to two contradictory historical accounts – one claiming that
Pontecorvo never passed relevant atomic secrets to the Soviets,10 the other claiming
that Pontecorvo was an atom spy.11 Historians have not so far challenged the emergence
of this contradiction. And the existence of disciplinary boundaries between history
of science and diplomatic history has tended to thwart attempts to understand the
Pontecorvo case in terms of construction of scientiﬁc knowledge in the context of
national politics and the agenda of government agencies. In this paper I cross these
boundaries and seek to resolve this contradiction.
The Pontecorvo case oﬀers important lessons to historians of science and policy-
makers.12 It demonstrates that in nuclear physics, the notion of atomic secrecy did not
always correspond to the practice of scientists, in which similar principles and in-
strumentation were used in both secret and open research. It also demonstrates that
during the nuclear age secret national political agendas were prioritized in respect to
the actual intelligence gathered about the spread of nuclear information. And it ques-
tions whether, entering a new age in which international controversies and security
policies require similar assessments, these covert agendas should continue to play a
major role.
An Italian Jew making physics ‘on the move’
The Italian-born nuclear physicist Bruno Pontecorvo was known by many as a ﬂam-
boyant character who liked travelling more than anything else. By 1950 he and his
Swedish wife had three children and an equal number of passports (including Canadian
and British). In 1936 the young Cucciolo Pontecorvo left the Institute of Physics in
9 These details are in ‘Defection to USSR of Dr. Pontecorvo’, FO 371/84837 and ‘Disappearance of
Dr. Bruno Pontecorvo in Finland’, FO 371/86437. The Foreign and Commonwealth Oﬃce (FCO) originally
retained those ﬁles under Section 3(4) of the Public Records Act (1958). In March 2002 I asked the FCO
Records Manager to review the ﬁles to establish whether the secrecy conditions still applied. In May 2002 the
papers were released.
10 M. Mafai, Il Lungo Freddo. Storia di Bruno Pontecorvo, lo scienziato che scelse l’URSS, Milan, 1992;
S. M. Bilenky, T. D. Blokhintseva, I. G. Pokrovskaya and M. G. Sapozhnikov (eds.), B. Pontecorvo Selected
Scientiﬁc Works, Bologna, 1997.
11 C. Pincher, Too Secret Too Long, London, 1984; H. Montgomery Hyde, The Atom Bomb Spies,
London, 1980; J. Costello, Mask of Treachery, London, 1988.
12 A similar criticism on consolidated historical accounts and their limits is in L. Scott and S. Smith,
‘Lessons of October: historians, political scientists, policy-makers and the Cuban Missile Crisis ’, Inter-
national Aﬀairs (1994), 70, 659–84.
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Rome to conduct research in the Laboratoire de chimie nucle´aire in Paris.13 The re-
search position at the French institute was supposed to be temporary and it was initially
funded through the Italian Ministry of National Education. But in 1938 the promul-
gation of the racial laws in Italy forced Pontecorvo, as an academic of Jewish origins, to
make the leave permanent to avoid returning to Italy.14 However, Pontecorvo could not
settle in Paris because in 1940 the invasion of France by German troops forced him to
ﬂee to the USA. Before 1940 Pontecorvo’s travels had been forced mainly by con-
tingencies, but from that year onwards they continued for research reasons (conferences
and visits to research laboratories) and personal pleasure. Between 1941 and 1943 he
worked for Wells Surveys in Oklahoma, travelling frequently to Chicago and New
York. In 1943 Pontecorvo settled in Canada and became a member of the British
mission involved in the Anglo-Canadian project to harness nuclear energy. But he con-
tinued travelling to major US cities and to Europe, visiting England and Italy. From
1949 Pontecorvo worked at the AERE based in Harwell. Though he always kept his
position within the British nuclear programme, from 1943 to 1950 he was tempted to
leave many times following oﬀers of positions by several universities in America and
Europe.15 Pontecorvo’s life up to 1950 was characterized by many travels, uncertainty
with respect to the future and resistance to settling in a permanent position either in a
university or in a national laboratory.
It is sensible to assume that this way of living inﬂuenced Pontecorvo’s nuclear
research. Considered by science historians as a pioneer of neutrino physics, an experi-
enced cosmic ray researcher and a master of particle physics, he had a far wider range of
interests. If moving from place to place is a way of interpreting his life, shifting con-
stantly from the domain of ‘knowing new particles ’ to that of ‘using them in practice ’
is a way of interpreting his physics. This included solving applied problems with the
experimental practices of particle physics and gaining new knowledge in particle
physics with instrumentation devised for applied problems. Very often Pontecorvo’s
study of new nuclear phenomena was followed by expectations over their possible
application.16 This ‘ﬂexibility’ in the use of techniques for the study of nuclear physics
13 Cucciolo, meaning ‘puppy’, was Pontecorvo’s nickname among Fermi’s group. G. Holton, ‘Fermi’s
group and the recapture of Italy’s place in physics’, in The Scientiﬁc Imagination (ed. G. Holton), New York,
1978, 155–98.
14 On the Fascist racial laws in Italy and their impact on the national academic community see G. Israel
and P. Nastasi, Scienza e Razza nell’Italia Fascista, Bologna, 1998. The racial laws allowed Pontecorvo to go
back to Italy, but they forced him to renounce further employment in Italian universities. Between 1937 and
1940 Pontecorvo’s research was funded through the French National Research Council (CNRS) and the
Carnegie Foundation (‘University Documents’, PNVO 1/2).
15 Pontecorvo was oﬀered a position by the Universities of Michigan, Rochester and California and by
General Electric in 1946; by Cornell University in 1947; and by the Universities of Rome, Pisa and Cagliari
between 1948 and 1950.
16 For example, in 1940 the recent research conducted by French physicist Andre´ Lazard and Pontecorvo
on ‘atomic phosphorescence’ prompted expectations of possible applications in medicine. Interviewed by the
French newspaper L’Oeuvre, Pontecorvo claimed that his research would have had a major impact in medi-
cine, as ionizing radiation was going to have beneﬁcial eﬀects on organisms (‘Ici, l’on fabrique des atomes!, ’
L’Oeuvre, 6 April 1939, copy in ‘Assorted Papers’, PNVO 4/2). In 1949, Pontecorvo’s research on mesons had
prompted expectation of their possible use as ‘atom-busting’ rays. Pontecorvo was hopeful that he would be
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raises the question of Pontecorvo and his relation with secret research. At the time of his
defection (and still many years later), it was claimed that Pontecorvo, being mainly
interested in cosmic ray research and particle physics, had limited access to secret re-
search. But I want to show that it was exactly Pontecorvo’s expertise in these research
areas that led him into secret research. In order to do so, I reconsider here two major
aspects of Pontecorvo’s research: the manufacture of instrumentation for geophysical
prospecting and pile physics.
In 1941 Pontecorvo was employed by the Wells Surveys research laboratory in Tulsa
thanks to Emilio Segre`, one of his former colleagues at the Physics Institute in Rome. In
May 1940 Segre`, who had been doing research at the Radiation Laboratory of Berkeley
since 1938, turned down the proposal for a job at Wells Surveys. He eventually
recommended Pontecorvo toWells Surveys engineer Serge Scherbatskoy, who helped the
Italian physicist to ﬁnd a place in the company.17 Wells Surveys was a company mainly
involved in well-logging in relation to oil surveys, but it was expanding quickly into the
development of instrumentation to locate radioactive deposits. As a Wells Surveys re-
searcher, Pontecorvo ﬁled four patent applications for geophysical prospecting in-
strumentation.18 Three of the detectors that he designed were based on the technique of
radioactive well-logging. This consists of irradiating geological strata with a neutron
source to produce a return radiation, which is detected electrically and plotted. The
log so obtained shows the well characteristics (such as, for example, its depth).19 The
fourth detector was not designed for well-logging, but to detect radioactive deposits.
Pontecorvo used the ‘coincidence technique’ to distinguish between ores of the
uranium family and those of the thorium family (Figure 1).20 This technique was devel-
oped in the early 1930s in the context of cosmic ray research and greatly enhanced by
the Italian physicist Bruno Rossi with the coincidence-counting circuit.21 Pontecorvo
able to set up a ‘meson-ray production plant’ (‘University of British Columbia lecturer probing new atom-
busting ray’, undated press cutting from a Canadian newspaper in ‘Scientiﬁc Correspondence’, PNVO 4/1/1).
17 E. Segre`, A Mind always in Motion, Berkeley, 1993, 159–60.
18 Using radioactivity in prospecting was a signiﬁcant innovation. Between 1920 and 1940 this was carried
out using electricity, magnetism and seismography in surface and subsurface techniques. Radioactive pro-
specting derived from the electrical subsurface method consisting of introducing cables in the well and plot-
ting the diﬀerence in potential between the surface and the geological strata. A historical study of this method
(and others) is in G. C. Bowker, Science on the Run: Information Management and Industrial Geophysics
at Schlumberger, 1920–1940, Cambridge, MA, 1994.
19 B. Pontecorvo and G. Swift, ‘Geophysical prospecting’, P.N. US 2353619, 11 July 1944 (ﬁled 18
September 1941); idem, ‘Method of geophysical prospecting’, P.N. US 2508772, 23 May 1950 (ﬁled 31
October 1942); idem, ‘Well surveying’, P.N. US 2398324, 9 April 1946 (ﬁled 10 August 1943). Also on the
same issue see idem, ‘Neutron well logging: a new geological method based on nuclear physics’,Oil and Gas
Journal (1941), 40, 32–3.
20 B. Pontecorvo, ‘Method and apparatus for geophysical exploration’, P.N. US 2349753, 23 May 1950
(ﬁled 31 October 1942). Natural uranium is rarer and more precious than thorium. Within the context of
atomic projects, ﬁssile material obtained from uranium was used in weaponry. By contrast the ﬁssile material
U233, obtained from thorium, proved to be of lower ﬁssile quality and its use in weaponry was ruled out.
I. Ursu, op. cit. (3), 123.
21 The technique consisted of separating Geiger–Mu¨ller counters with metallic plates absorbing low-
energy particles. The Rossi circuit applied to each counter a valve-condenser-resistor system as switch for
the counters. Bruno Rossi, Cosmic Rays, New York, 1964, 46–53.
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shifted the technique from cosmic ray research to geophysical prospecting. Geophysical
specimens containing thorium emit radiation in the form of quanta of gamma rays at an
energy of about 2.6 million electron volts, while similar specimens containing radium or
uranium emit radiation of the same type but at an energy of about 2.2 million electron
volts. A detector provided with a coincidence apparatus can distinguish diﬀerent radio-
active elements in the ores by detecting the degree of penetration of their radiation.
This application of the coincidence technique indicates the ‘proximity’ between two
research areas that would eventually be classiﬁed very diﬀerently in atomic security
regulation. Cosmic ray research was open research, while geophysical prospecting
would become secret applied science in relation to the mapping of radioactive deposits.
But Pontecorvo’s ﬁrst contact with secret research was not in direct relation to geo-
physical prospecting. In 1943 Pontecorvo moved to Canada and participated in the
Figures 1A and B. The geophysical prospecting detector with the Rossi circuit. From Bruno
Pontecorvo, ‘Method and apparatus for geophysical prospecting’, P.N. US 2349753.
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secret Anglo-Canadian project code-named ‘Tube Alloys’. This was funded through
the British Department for Scientiﬁc and Industrial Research (DSIR) and the Canadian
National Research Council to explore the potentialities of harnessing nuclear energy.
Directed by British physicist John Cockcroft from 1944, the project focused on the
design of a heterogeneous nuclear pile deploying enriched uranium and moderated with
heavy water.22 Pontecorvo joined the project and provided vital help on several issues
related to the design of the Nuclear Reactor X (NRX). According to oﬃcial historian
Margaret Gowing, the DSIR secretary Edward Appleton was initially against
Pontecorvo’s employment:
When it was urged that the brilliant physicist Pontecorvo should be engaged for the British
section of the team, the secretary of DSIR protested. He did not want to add to the number of
non-British nationals, but he was pressed hard in view of Pontecorvo’s reputation and the
shortage of physicists.23
This decision was certainly fruitful for the nuclear programme. At ﬁrst, the NRX
project employed mathematical calculations on lattice dimensions (the exponential
experiment). Eventually, other engineering problems such as ‘experimental features,
hazards, suitability of materials, and necessity for cooling’ were analysed.24 The calcu-
lations on the lattice dimension depended upon experimental data on the behaviour of
neutrons in the pile. In order to obtain these data, Pontecorvo was sent to the Argonne
Laboratory, just outside Chicago, where Fermi and his co-workers were running
the CP-2 pile.25 Back in Canada, Pontecorvo also made studies on the properties of
ﬁssile nuclear materials, their products in nuclear reactions and ﬁnally their interaction
in the pile.26 He contributed also to the analysis of materials used in the pile shielding.27
His role in the context of NRX planning and research was indeed of great importance.
But when Pontecorvo moved to Canada in 1943 he also continued working on geo-
physical prospecting. In September 1944 he met with his former Wells Surveys col-
league Serge Scherbatskoy to carry out some ﬁeldwork. They explored an area within
the Northwest Territories of Canada and a secret report was sent to Cockcroft on
22 Heterogeneous means using a solid fuel and a liquid moderator. On the Anglo-Canadian project, see
M. Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy 1939–1945, London, 1964. On its contribution to the post-war
Canadian nuclear programme, see R. Bothwell, Nucleus: The History of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited,
Toronto, 1988; D. G. Hurst, ‘Overview of nuclear research and development’, in Canada Enters the Nuclear
Age (ed. D. G. Hurst), Montreal and Kingston, 1997, 1–32.
23 M. Gowing, op. cit. (22), 191. The Czech physicist George Placzek and his French colleague Pierre
Auger, both already in the Tube Alloys project, were inﬂuential in Pontecorvo’s employment. M. Mafai,
op. cit. (10), 125.
24 J. Dunworth to H. Skinner, 26 April 1946, in ‘Harwell pile discussion group, 1946,’ AB 12/19.
25 B. Pontecorvo, ‘Some information on physical data obtained on a recent trip to Chicago (Blue Print)’,
24 June 1944, AB 2/643. CP-2 stands for Chicago Pile 2. Pontecorvo had visited Chicago already in the
summer of 1942, when the project on Fermi’s ﬁrst pile, CP-1, had just started.
26 For example, the experimental study of ﬁssion properties of by-products of nuclear reactions.
B. Pontecorvo and D. West, ‘The ﬁssion properties of radium 226 and protactinium 233’, 1 December 1945,
AB 2/318.
27 B. Pontecorvo, ‘Some data useful in shielding problems’, 8 August 1944, AB 2/655 and idem, ‘The side
shield of the polymer plant’, 8 August 1944, AB 2/656.
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the radioactive deposits found there (Figure 2).28 In October a meeting was held in
Washington by the US Army as part of the Manhattan Project in order to compare
diﬀerent instruments for geophysical prospecting manufactured by British, Canadian
and American scientists. Pontecorvo attended the meeting on behalf of the British group
and learned about detectors of several kinds. The meeting’s chairman, US Army Co-
lonel Paul Guarin, stressed that all the research on prospecting instrumentation ought
to be considered secret.29 In view of prospecting high-grade ores, Pontecorvo suggested
to Cockcroft that a combined eﬀort joining aerial surveys with large ionization cham-
bers and land surveys with portable counters would represent a better way to carry out
Figure 2. Map showing areas with uranium deposits in the Northwest Territories. From
B. Pontecorvo, ‘Report on trip to Port Radium (secret) ’, AB 1/648.
28 B. Pontecorvo, ‘Report on trip to Port Radium, September 1944 (secret) ’, AB 1/648.
29 It was also argued that Wells Surveys produced the most innovative instrumentation. Appendix 1,
‘Dr Pontecorvo’s notes’, 31 October 1944, in F. H. Burstall, H. Carmichael, A. H. Gillieson and J. Hardwick,
‘Report on a technical conference on prospecting problems held inWashington, 24–26 January 1946’, AB 2/67.
Nuclear science, politics and security in the Pontecorvo case 397
uranium prospecting.30 Pontecorvo’s participation in vital aspects of the Manhattan
Project in the context of allied war research programmes demonstrates that he was
considered a valuable and trusted expert by senior members of the British and American
nuclear establishment. Indeed, he had a role of paramount importance in the pro-
duction and exchange of information on nuclear knowledge and techniques for the
detection of uranium deposits and the production of ﬁssile material in view of their
military use.31
The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki marked the accomplishment of war re-
search in nuclear physics, but it also signalled the beginning of national projects aimed
at exploiting nuclear energy for military purposes. According to plans for the post-
war British nuclear programme, Pontecorvo was intended as the pile physics expert
of a new nuclear establishment based at Harwell in Britain.32 Just before Christmas
1945, Pontecorvo was oﬀered a position as Principal Scientiﬁc Oﬃcer (PSO).33 But
Pontecorvo did not accept the oﬀer immediately. He was tempted to leave the British
mission because the physicist James Chadwick, who directed British nuclear policy
from Washington, DC, prohibited him from travelling to Europe. Pontecorvo wanted
to visit his parents in Italy, but in this period investigations about spying activity
on atomic matters in Canada had started following the defection of Lieutenant
Igor Gouzenko from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa.34 In February 1946 Pontecorvo
met Chadwick and stressed that if allowed to travel he would accept the British oﬀer,
otherwise he was ready to leave for a position in an American university or a private
laboratory. Following the end of investigations on the Soviet spy-ring and the public
disclosure of the case,35 Chadwick raised no objections and Pontecorvo left Canada
for Europe.36
But coming back from Europe, things changed once again. Pontecorvo wanted to
stay in Canada to complete the NRX project, now running at full speed in the newly
30 B. Pontecorvo, ‘Notes on prospecting for radioactive materials’, 2 April 1945, AB 2/671.
31 Pontecorvo also possessed safe conducts to travel between diﬀerent sites of the Manhattan Project in the
US and Canada. ‘ In carrying out his oﬃcial duties he has occasion to travel from one country to the other
on oﬃcial business and to carry with him conﬁdential documents.’ Oﬃce of the High Commissioner for the
UK to Whom it May Concern, 12.2.1943 in ‘Oﬃcial letters’, PNVO 1/5.
32 ‘Notes of meeting held on 13 February, 1945 to discuss increments and promotion of U.K. staﬀ’ in ‘Staﬀ
recruiting’, AB 6/171.
33 A. Sumner to B. Pontecorvo, 18 December 1945, in ‘Scientiﬁc correspondence, 1945–1950’, PNVO
4/1/1.
34 In August 1945 Chadwick wrote to Cockcroft that ‘ it would be most indiscreet to allow Pontecorvo to
visit Italy in the near future and he cannot be allowed to go until matters are much clearer than they are now.
… It will take three or four months’. J. Chadwick to J. Cockcroft, 20 August 1945, ‘Work in North America,
Canadian Project’, CHAD IV, 28.
35 The discovery of the Canadian spy-ring led to the arrest of physicist Alan Nunn May and further secret
investigation of German e´migre´ physicist Klaus Fuchs. On the Gouzenko case see A. Moorehead, The
Traitors: The Double Life of Fuchs, Pontecorvo and NunnMay, London, 1952, 5–18; R. Aldrich, The Hidden
Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence, London, 2001, 103–9.
36 The Manhattan project director Leslie Groves was also informed about Pontecorvo’s travel to Europe:
‘Later on he will be employed by the British Government in the new Establishment. He will probably take
steps to acquire British citizenship.’ J. Chadwick to L. Groves, 10 April 1946, ‘Work in North America,
Canadian project’, CHAD IV, 28.
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built atomic research establishment of Chalk River. Cockcroft accepted this decision.
On the other hand, he was aware that the NRX project was a crucial source of infor-
mation for the British nuclear programme. Thus, to establish an eﬀective mechanism to
exchange information between the group working in Canada and those working on the
new British Experimental Pile O (BEPO) at Harwell, he promoted the constitution of
a ‘Production Pile Discussion Group’. This acted ‘as an advisory body of the UK
design group and as committee for answering technical queries sent from the UK’.37
Pontecorvo was a prominent member of the group, advising Harwell scientists on
technical matters and providing solutions to important problems of design.
If pile physics and geophysical prospecting had kept the Italian scientist busy during
the war, the post-war period was characterized by an intensiﬁcation of pure research in
particle physics. In 1946 Pontecorvo started planning experimental trials for the detec-
tion of neutrinos produced by nuclear reactors. Together with Canadian physicists G. C.
Hanna and D. H. W. Kirkwood, Pontecorvo developed a new type of proportional
counter very sensitive to low-range b-ray energies.38 This was used to analyse the
b-spectrum of tritium and the physical phenomenon known as L-capture, in which
neutrinos are produced.39Moreover, Pontecorvo set up a cosmic ray laboratory in Chalk
River. This was the starting point for two years of research conducted at Chalk River
with the help of the Canadian physicist E. P. (Ted) Hincks on meson disintegration.40
This ‘shift ’ to problems of particle physics can be explained by Pontecorvo’s desire to
develop studies in which great advances had followed the end of the SecondWorldWar.
The use of new particle accelerators and nuclear reactors had allowed the production by
artiﬁcial means of physical reactions never possible before. Recent developments in
cosmic ray research had also revealed many aspects of the interaction between particles
37 Minutes of meeting, ‘Harwell Pile discussion group, 1946’, AB 12/19. The engineer James Kendall, who
was responsible for pile design at Harwell visited Canada in the early summer of 1946 and, according to
Gowing, returned to Britain ‘saying that the help of Bruno Pontecorvo…was worth that of all the others put
together’. M. Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945–1952, London, 1974,
380.
38 G. C. Hanna and D. H. Kirkwood, ‘High multiplication proportional counters for energy measure-
ments’, Physical Review (1949), 75, 985–6. The proportional counting technique diﬀers from the coincidence
counting technique because it is based upon the detection of the initial ionizing event that gives formation to
secondary electrons. These in turn aﬀect the gas ﬁlling the counter and give rise to a phenomenon called ‘gas
ampliﬁcation’ in which an ‘avalanche’ of electrons is produced. In the proportional counter technique, the
experimenter focuses on the electric pulse due to the initial avalanche, while in the coincidence counting
technique the experimenter focuses on the regular pulses that take place afterwards and are independent from
the initial gas ampliﬁcation. For details see S. Korﬀ, Electron and Nuclear Counters, New York, 1946, 6–14
and B. Rossi and H. H. Staub, Ionization Chambers and Counters: Experimental Techniques, New York,
1949, 72.
39 But their proportional counters were not sensitive enough to detect neutrinos. In 1956 physicists
F. Reines and C. Cowan detected for the ﬁrst time neutrinos using the Savannah River nuclear pile in the US.
40 Pontecorvo assumed that the meson decay could be interpreted as an inverse b-process involving the
production of an electron and two neutrinos. B. Pontecorvo, ‘Nuclear capture of mesons and the meson
decay’, Physical Review (1947), 72, 246–7. To validate this assumption, Pontecorvo and Hincks developed a
new coincidence counter arrangement to detect the meson decay. An account of their experimental results was
given in B. Pontecorvo and E. P. Hincks, ‘On the disintegration products of the 2.2-msec. meson’, Physics
Review (1950), 77, 102–20. In this paper evidence in support of the ‘electron+2 neutrino’ process was also
provided.
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in nuclear processes. But even when involved in ‘pure’ scientiﬁc endeavours, Pontecorvo
did not abandon areas of secret research. He used classiﬁed instrumentation to perform
cosmic ray experiments. He continued advising British scientists on how to develop
counters for geophysical prospecting. And ﬁnally he started consulting activities
for European and American companies working in this ﬁeld. Through his mastery of
the dual-use detector technology, he was a key part of the developing British nuclear
programme.
Although primarily focused on cosmic ray research, Pontecorvo used secret apparatus
to perform coincidence experiments. These included instruments like the kicksorters
(pulse analysers) used to assess the energy range of particles entering a counter. The
publication of details concerning kicksorters had been allowed only recently.41 More-
over, in 1947 Pontecorvo’s early reports on geophysical prospecting were transferred to
the Telecommunication Research Establishment (TRE) based inMalvern. The TRE had
been prominent in radar research during the war years and was now involved in the
manufacture of electronic detectors in view of their application in several areas of
nuclear research. Indeed, counters were used for particle detection in nuclear piles,
accelerators, cosmic ray research, and uranium prospecting. As far as the latter is con-
cerned, since 1945, British intelligence had conducted investigations in several places
around the world to map uranium ores, but more sensitive instrumentation was re-
quired.42 TRE developed two research programmes: portable devices for ﬁeld explo-
ration and instrumentation for aerial surveys. In 1947 E. Franklin produced the ﬁrst
portable rate-meter, still based on coincidence circuitry (Figure 3).43
Security measures in this area of research were very strict. In 1948 the TRE physicist
Dennis Taylor published the description of a new portable c-ray detector in the estab-
lishment newsletter, causing an outburst among AERE managers. Electronic equipment
for geological survey to determine the proportions of uranium and thorium in samples
of ores was considered a vital secret.44 C. F. Davidson was very upset by Taylor’s
publication:
To publish reports in technical journals is surely to make a quite unnecessary free gift of
information to certain countries particularly interested in what we are doing in this ﬁeld.
Perhaps it is salutary to remember that release of any information concerning prospecting of
non-ferrous ores within the USSR is a capital oﬀence.45
41 H. F. Freundlich, E. P. Hincks and W. J. Ozeroﬀ, ‘A pulse analyser for nuclear research’, Review of
Scientiﬁc Instruments (1947), 18, 90–100. The issue of secrecy for this device is analysed in P. Galison, op. cit.
(4), 296. Pontecorvo used this pulse analyser and also another one designed by C. H. Westcott and G. C.
Hanna. Details were published in ‘A pulse amplitude analyser for nuclear research using pre-treated pulses’,
Review of Scientiﬁc Instruments (1949), 20, 181–8.
42 In 1943 geologist C. F. Davidson of the Geological Survey and the Museum of London set up a uranium
committee on behalf of the Ministry of Supply. Intelligence-gathering provided the committee with an ap-
proximate list of uranium deposits worldwide. At the time most of the prospecting work was done with GM
counters supplied by the Canadians. On 29 August 1945 a meeting took place in which it was stressed that ‘the
manufacture of counters in the UK must be regarded as urgent’. ‘Uranium intelligence, Section 1’, AB 1/507.
See also M. Gowing, op. cit. (22), 180–2.
43 E. Franklin, ‘GM tubes portable equipment for uranium prospecting, 1948’, AB 15/9.
44 C. F. Davidson to J. Hardwick, 14 April 1948, in ‘Security, general’, AB 6/115.
45 C. F. Davidson to J. Hardwick, 14 April 1948 in ‘Security, general’, AB 6/115. Original emphasis.
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Davidson also asked a British envoy in Washington, DC to ﬁnd out whether the Soviet
Union might proﬁt from the publication of details. The envoy replied that the open
publication of equipment would allow Soviet agents to interpret the British radio-
metric maps.46 During 1947 and 1948 Pontecorvo continued advising Cockcroft on
detector technology and Cockcroft continued transmitting the speciﬁc data provided by
Pontecorvo on counters to the TRE.47 In July 1948, soon after the outburst caused by
Taylor’s publication, Pontecorvo visited the TRE and did some coincidence circuit
work there with the reproached physicist.48 Pontecorvo also acted as consultant for
private companies involved in geophysical prospecting. In 1946 a Ministry of Supply
oﬃcer had made concessions to Pontecorvo about his consulting, but at the same time
stressed that he was prohibited from ﬁling patents.49 That was why Pontecorvo stopped
doing so, leaving this task to Scherbatskoy, with whom he was still associated in
a number of projects for commercial counters.50 Moreover, from 1948 Pontecorvo’s
Figures 3A and B. E. Franklin’s rate-meter and detector still based on the Rossi circuit. From
E. Franklin, ‘GM tube portable equipment for uranium prospecting’, in AB 15/350.
46 ‘A comparable situation does, in fact, exist in reverse, in that our Intelligence has information of foreign
counter readings which cannot be interpreted in terms of grades of ores because lack of data in the makeup of
the counters’, R. A. Thomson to C. F. Davidson, 1 June 1948, in ‘Security, general’, AB 6/115.
47 J. Cockcroft to B. Pontecorvo, 3 February 1947, in ‘Scientiﬁc correspondence, 1945–1950’, PNVO 4/1/1.
48 B. Pontecorvo, ‘Equipment required for experimental work, 1948’, AB 1/648.
49 A. E. Fry to Dr Watson, 31 December 1946, in ‘Scientiﬁc correspondence, 1945–1950’, PNVO 4/1/1.
50 S. Scherbatskoy to B. Pontecorvo, 14 March 1947, in ‘Scientiﬁc correspondence, 1945–1950’,
PNVO 4/1/1.
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detectors in neutron well-logging had attracted the interest of European oil companies,
especially the Italian Oil Agency (Agenzia Generale Italiana Petroli – AGIP) and the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.51
In 1948 the British scientiﬁc journalNature announced that Bruno Pontecorvo, ‘who
was responsible for pile development in Canada and is now conducting fundamental
atomic energy research in nuclear physics’, was now appointed as Senior Principal
Scientiﬁc Oﬃcer (SPSO) at Harwell.52 Pontecorvo wanted to move to Europe to stay
closer to his family and at the same time Cockcroft wanted an experienced scientist
to supervise several research projects developed in the British nuclear programme.
Primarily, Pontecorvo was called to participate in the recent project of cooperation
between several European countries for the completion of a cosmic ray research lab-
oratory at the Pic du Midi in the Pyrenees. But he was also involved in other issues. For
example, in May 1949 he was introduced to the Power Steering Committee (PSC) and
eventually became a full PSC member.53 From 1947 the PSC was the most important
committee in Harwell, discussing issues related to reactor technology, ﬁssile material,
pile design and study of new materials to be deployed in nuclear reactors.54 The PSC
gathered the most important and inﬂuential AERE scientists, including their director,
John Cockcroft. Even if Pontecorvo went to Harwell to further his studies in cosmic ray
research and particle physics, his membership in the PSC reveals that more generally
in the nuclear establishment pure and applied, open and secret, research were closely
related. The web of relationships between research projects of a pure or applied nature
was indeed represented in an AERE organization chart that demonstrates some of
the links between secret and open research areas (Figure 4).55 As the chart shows, pure
research was supposed to provide knowledge eventually useful in the study of future
reactors, as much as nuclear piles were supposed to be the experimental facilities for the
achievement of new knowledge in particle physics. Thus, if a strict security regulation
was enforced at Harwell for all scientiﬁc personnel, then it is sensible to assume that an
SPSO involved in the supervision of so many aspects of nuclear research was not re-
stricted from accessing secret areas as well as documents.
In Britain Pontecorvo continued research on new types of proportional counters for
very low energy radiation.56 The detection of new particles in cosmic rays, nuclear piles
or accelerators was certainly one purpose of this research. But the other was the deﬁ-
nition of new types of counter of greater accuracy in view of further explorations for the
prospecting of radioactive material (as well as oil and gas). In 1950 Pontecorvo learnt
that Scherbatskoy had left Wells Surveys and joined the Perforating Guns Atlas Cor-
poration, ‘a new company that has powerful ﬁnancial backing and which is going into
51 G. Fidecaro, ‘Bruno Pontecorvo: from Rome to Dubna’, in S. M. Bilenky et al. (eds.), op. cit. (10), 474.
52 ‘Scientiﬁc Civil Service’, Nature (1948), 161, 195.
53 Minutes of meeting, 4 May 1949, ‘Power Steering Committee, vol. 2, 1948–49’, AB 12/74.
54 ‘Power Steering Committee, vol.1, 1947’, AB 12/57.
55 Survey of Nuclear Physics Programme with other projects in ‘Power Steering Committee, vol. 2,
1948–1949’, AB 12/74.
56 B. Pontecorvo, ‘Recent developments in proportional counter technique’, Helvetica Physica Acta
(1950), 23, 97–118.
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competition with Wells Surveys’.57 Both companies were conducting prospecting work
in Canada for the Combined Development Trust (CDT), born in 1944 to optimize
cooperation between the US, Britain and Canada and achieve a monopoly of uranium
supplies worldwide. The prospecting corporations regarded the manufacture of detec-
tors as an industrial secret because new detectors with increased sensitivity allowed
prospecting for high-grade uranium ores and thus guaranteed domination of the com-
mercial sector of this technology. Scherbatskoy asked for Pontecorvo’s help. He wanted
to devise a detector sensitive to both neutrons and c-rays and stressed that his plan
should be considered top secret by Pontecorvo and that ‘we are especially anxious that
nobody, especially nobody at Wells Surveys, should ﬁnd out we are working on this
problem’.58 The request came at the end of a proﬁtable cooperation, as from 1947
Scherbatskoy and Pontecorvo had continued exchanging secret information on new
types of detector and exploring their possible application in the prospecting industry.
As a matter of fact, in the context of prospecting research, commercial, industrial and
national secrecy were intertwined.
In March 1950, following Fuchs’s arrest and the witch-hunts in the US and Europe, a
terriﬁed Pontecorvo asked for a hearing with Henry Arnold, the AERE security oﬃcer.
Figure 4. ‘Survey on nuclear physics programme with other projects, 1948’, in ‘Power Steering
Committee, Vol. 2, 1948–1949’, AB 12/74.
57 S. Scherbatskoy to B. Pontecorvo, 19 January 1950, in ‘Scientiﬁc correspondence, 1945–1950’, PNVO
4/1/1.
58 S. Scherbatskoy to B. Pontecorvo, 27 June 1949, in ‘Scientiﬁc correspondence, 1945–1950’, PNVO
4/1/1.
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He confessed that he had communist relatives in Italy, although he regarded himself as
uninterested in politics. Arnold interrogated Pontecorvo a few times and concluded that
although Pontecorvo had no clear ‘political leaning’, a potential risk from the security
point of view existed because of his senior position in the establishment. AERE former
chief physicist Herbert Skinner suggested that Pontecorvo apply for a new experimental
chair about to be established at Liverpool University, where Skinner was now holder of
the Lyon Jones chair of experimental physics. The advertised position was in the con-
text of a plan for the expansion of the physics department and laboratory, where a new
synchro-cyclotron had been built. In June 1950 he was oﬀered the new chair.59 But
in July 1950 he was still very undecided about what to do. In fact, Cockcroft and
Skinner had not disallowed the Italian physicist from staying at Harwell, they had just
recommended him either to ‘step down’ so that he was not entitled to access secret
documentation or to move to Liverpool.60 At the end of July Pontecorvo decided to go
to Liverpool University and soon afterwards he left to go on holiday in Italy.
But Pontecorvo never returned to Britain. Summer 1950 was characterized by an
intensiﬁcation of the witch-hunts, with several investigations and arrests carried out on
both sides of the Atlantic. In the US, the simple allegation of having communist sym-
pathies had become a matter for investigation and, at the beginning of October, ninety-
odd foreign nationals were detained by US security authorities for their political ideals.
In Europe many governments had decided to intensify vetting procedures for civil ser-
vants and, more generally, workers in the public sector. In September 1950 Ludwig
Ja´nossy, a cosmic ray researcher employed by Dublin University, decided to stay in his
home country of Hungary rather than come back to Ireland and face likely persecution.
From a holiday resort near the Circeo Mountain in Italy, Pontecorvo was following the
news on the witch-hunts, increasingly worried about his future. If the bubble of his
communist acquaintances were to burst in the press, then he would become an easy
target for the witch-hunts. Whilst in Italy, he let the Russians know that he wanted to
leave the West and at the end of September he ﬂew to Finland and then to Russia.61 His
departure obviously interrupted future plans of employment in Liverpool or any other
project, and for several months nobody knew his whereabouts.62 But by November
1950 it was almost certain that he had defected.
As we have seen, before his defection Pontecorvo had had a very important role at
Harwell and full access to atomic secrets in view of his senior position in the British
nuclear programme. Pontecorvo’s expertise, built upon participation in the Canadian
and British nuclear programmes, made him aware of diﬀerent technologies and
59 Vice-Chancellor J. Mountford, Liverpool University, to B. Pontecorvo, 6 June 1950, in ‘Scientiﬁc cor-
respondence, 1945–1950’, PNVO 4/1/1.
60 Skinner wrote to Pontecorvo, ‘As I told you some time ago, you are certain to get the oﬀer of a B post
at Harwell. … So I think you have to decide whether you prefer a University post to staying at Harwell. ’
H. Skinner to B. Pontecorvo, 12 July 1950, in ‘Scientiﬁc correspondence, 1945–1950’, PNVO 4/1/1.
61 One of Pontecorvo’s cousins was a prominent member of the Italian Communist Party (PCI).
62 In October Skinner wrote to Bruno’s brother, Guido, ‘I am afraid I am also beginning to be seriously
worried about your brother … As regards this university, Bruno has not so far seriously let us down[.] …
However, of course the lack of news over the last 5–6 weeks is certainly disconcerting’. H. Skinner to
G. Pontecorvo, 10 October 1950, in ‘Scientiﬁc correspondence, 1945–1950’, PNVO 4/1/1.
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materials in use in pile physics and diﬀerent options for nuclear reactors. During one
of the last PSC meetings he attended, he had analysed in detail the importance of
developing heavy water reactors due to the decreasing cost of heavy water and their
greater output with respect to graphite reactors. His intimate knowledge of pile physics
included details of the production of ﬁssile material, by-products and shielding prob-
lems and even how to run a pile.63 At the same time, Pontecorvo’s expertise on detector
technology had made him an important expert in geophysical prospecting. The AERE
regulation on work being done in this area was strict : it was considered secret in
relation to British plans to achieve monopoly over uranium ores. The few American
companies producing detectors for geophysical exploration competed to provide the
CDT with more sensitive instrumentation and thus were interested in keeping the work
being done an industrial secret. Pontecorvo was deeply implicated in all these areas.
Play it down! The assessment of the Pontecorvo case
From January 1950 Fuchs’s arrest put the British atomic establishment under pressure,
creating a feeling of distrust among the press, the public and British politicians. More-
over, the Fuchs aﬀair was the subject of criticism from US political leaders, who had
made their partnership with Britain in nuclear matters conditional on the adoption of
tighter measures of atomic security. Thus Pontecorvo’s defection happened at a key
moment for British nuclear policy. What is revealed in the recently released papers is
that in order to save the negotiations with the US on the exchange of nuclear infor-
mation, a few British diplomats made a decision to play down the Pontecorvo case. It
was this covert and highly secret agenda which determined oﬃcial and public response
to Pontecorvo’s defection, as we shall now see.
In mid-1950 Britain was involved in important negotiations on nuclear matters with
the US and Canada. From July 1946, thanks to the Atomic Energy Act proposed by
Senator Brian McMahon, the US had withdrawn from cooperation with Britain and
Canada on nuclear matters. Eventually, the shortage of uranium available for the US
atomic programme had forced the Americans to reopen negotiations with Britain,
whose uranium supply was less depleted. In January 1948 a new agreement was reached
(the Modus Vivendi) including limited transfer of US nuclear information in exchange
for Britain’s uranium supplies. However, the Modus Vivendi did not satisfy the parties
involved. The Americans needed more uranium for their fast-expanding weapons pro-
gramme, while the British wanted information relevant to atomic weapons manufac-
ture. US diplomats saw this as a major obstacle to further negotiations. For the
following two years the negotiations proceeded erratically, although British diplomats
in the US were conﬁdent that a new agreement would be reached.64
In the wake of Pontecorvo’s disappearance, the British negotiators were worried that,
if it became known that Pontecorvo was likely to pass nuclear information to the
63 Minutes of meeting, 9 January 1950, in ‘Power Steering Committee, vol. 3, 1950’, AB 12/105. See also
M. Mafai, op. cit. (10), 128.
64 S. H. Paul, Nuclear Rivals: Anglo-American Atomic Relations, 1941–1952, Columbus, 2000, 103–66.
On the impact of the Fuchs case on the negotiation see also R. Aldrich, op. cit. (35), 380–4.
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Soviets, the negotiations would probably break down. Thus they tried anticipating US
criticism. The British Ambassador in Washington, Oliver Franks, the Foreign Oﬃce
under-secretary, Roger Makins, and Michael Perrin agreed a common strategy, and the
Cabinet Oﬃce in London and the British Embassy in Washington exchanged top secret
telegrams in which they agreed to play down the story.65 The Cabinet Oﬃce asked the
Embassy to inform the American authorities. The secret despatches stressed immedi-
ately that Pontecorvo was concerned with non-secret work and that he was only asked
to advise on matters of detail in nuclear pile physics.66 The Minister of Supply made a
similar claim during a parliamentary brieﬁng: Pontecorvo’s access to secret documents,
he insisted, was ‘ limited’. The information given to the press did not largely diﬀer from
that given almost three years before by the scientiﬁc journal Nature in its brief com-
munication about Pontecorvo’s appointment.
But the claimof a ‘ limited’ access contradicted the content of the oﬃcial atomic secrecy
regulations. According to the report on ‘Application of Secrecy Rules in Atomic Energy
Research’ drafted in 1948 to indicate how security rules applied to atomic energy work,
The general object of the security restrictions is to protect information necessary for the pro-
duction of ﬁssile material. They therefore cover pile design, extraction chemistry, plants for
separation of the isotopes of heavy elements, and also information about raw materials.67
The report also stressed that nuclear detectors were not necessarily classiﬁed, but that
‘work associated with similar instruments would be classiﬁed only if they were used
for secret application, as for example in searching for raw materials ’. Strauss’s claim
also contradicted the speciﬁc assessment conducted on Pontecorvo by Arnold in
April 1950, following Pontecorvo’s interrogation. According to Arnold, ‘As Bruno
PONTECORVO has access to Top Secret information, thus from the security stand-
point it is considered that a potential security risk exists ’.68
Meanwhile the British Embassy in Washington observed with satisfaction that the
press reaction was quiet. The American Senate elections had kept the American press
busy and politicians had shown only ‘passing interest ’.69 On 2 November Franks con-
tacted Makins, asking for continued silence:
I am accordingly anxious to let sleeping dogs lie and I have some hope that the matter may soon
be forgotten. …My concern is to ensure that as far as possible the Pontecorvo case shall not
blight the prospects of the negotiations on the Pentagon’s new plan for tripartite co-operation.70
65 ‘Emergency Top Secret Cypher Telegram’ from Cabinet Oﬃce to British Joint Services Mission
(B.J.S.M.), Washington, 20 October 1950, in ‘Defection to USSR of Dr. Pontecorvo’, FO 371/84837. Makins
was certainly aware of Pontecorvo’s role in the British nuclear programme because he was in frequent touch
with Cockcroft. The two had played a major role as negotiators within the Combined Policy Committee
(CPC), the body behind the UK–US atomic agreements.
66 ‘Top Secret Cypher Telegram’ from Cabinet Oﬃce to B.J.S.M., Washington, 23 October 1950, in
‘Defection to USSR of Dr. Pontecorvo’, FO 371/84837.
67 ‘Application of secrecy rules in atomic energy research, draft’, 5 May 1948, in ‘Security, general’, AB
6/115.
68 Harwell Security Service to the Ministry of Supply, 25 April 1950, ‘Secret draft on the Pontecorvo case’,
in ‘Defection to USSR of Dr. Pontecorvo’, FO 371/84837.
69 ‘Top Secret Cypher Telegram’ from B.J.S.M., Washington, to Cabinet Oﬃce, 24 October 1950, in
‘Defection to USSR of Dr. Pontecorvo’, FO 371/84837.
70 Oliver Frank to Roger Makins, 2 November 1950, in CAB 126/307.
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Perrin was advised that Franks wanted to ‘minimise the adverse repercussions of the
Pontecorvo case on the forthcoming negotiations’.71 He prepared the assessment on
Pontecorvo’s career carefully following this directive. This also constituted the basis for
a second parliamentary brieﬁng by Strauss, and for the request for information from the
US Atomic Energy Commission. According to Perrin, Pontecorvo had withdrawn from
technological work on heavy water piles, where his knowledge was in any case very
limited:
He was unlikely to have expert knowledge of the important technological features of the pile
such as heavy water puriﬁcation and recombination system; canning procedures, etc. He
has a good general picture of the possibilities of diﬀerent types of future reactors likely
to be important in a power programme though he would not be able to write out a detailed
speciﬁcation for anyone.72
Perrin’s portrait of Pontecorvo’s career was precisely tailored to minimize the re-
percussions of the Pontecorvo case on the US–UK negotiations; no mention of his PSC
membership, nor of his recent promotion of heavy water technologies at the PSC
meetings, was made.73 As far as Pontecorvo’s expertise on detectors was concerned,
Perrin stressed Pontecorvo’s research on cosmic rays whilst omitting any mention of his
work on geophysical prospecting. But Perrin certainly feared that Pontecorvo’s ex-
pertise was likely to be very important for the Soviet eﬀort to map their uranium de-
posits. In the late 1940s the Soviets were using a ‘tactic of the broad front ’, prospecting
large areas with diﬀerent geological structures to ﬁnd uranium ores.74 In 1947 and 1948
two British intelligence reports indicated the shortage of uranium ores as the limiting
factor of the Russian atomic weapons programme.75 In 1950 their uranium supply was
still regarded ‘as an urgent problem’ by Soviet geologists.76 Finally, as we have seen,
Russian instrumentation for prospecting was considered by American intelligence not
adequate for geophysical exploration. Though Pontecorvo’s expertise could thus po-
tentially give a major boost to the USSR’s nuclear programme, this fact was also
omitted from the oﬃcial British assessment of his defection.
Moreover, Perrin conﬁrmed Pontecorvo’s previous role as nuclear pile expert in
Canada, but he did not mention his PSC membership. He certainly feared that
Pontecorvo might disclose a recent PSC research programme, developed by the AERE
and the Admiralty, focused on heavy water reactors for naval propulsion. During recent
meetings, secret technical papers had been passed to other PSC members as well as
71 ‘Secret ’, R. Makins to Mr Perrin, November 1950, in ‘Defection to USSR of Dr. Pontecorvo’, FO
371/84837.
72 ‘Secret and Guard’, M. Perrin to R. Makins, 9 November 1950, in ‘Defection to USSR of Dr.
Pontecorvo’, FO 371/84837.
73 Perrin’s argument was certainly contradicted by the recent pledge in favour of the adoption of heavy
water reactors made by Pontecorvo at the PSC meeting of January 1950. See the relevant discussion above
in this paper.
74 D. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956, New Haven,
1994, 174–7.
75 M. S. Goodman, ‘British intelligence and the Soviet atomic bomb, 1945–1950’, in Journal of Strategic
Studies (forthcoming). I am grateful to Michael Goodman for providing me with an early version of his paper.
76 D. Holloway, op. cit. (74), 177.
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Pontecorvo.77 Following Fuchs’s arrest, Cockcroft became very worried that secret
documentation regarding defence purposes had circulated among PSC members and
decided that naval reactors should not be discussed at PSC meetings any more.
After Perrin’s carefully constructed assessment asserted that Pontecorvo’s defection
presented no worries regarding the leakage of nuclear information, the FO was alert to
any attempt to revive the story. For example, on 24 November the British envoy in
Helsinki informed the FO that the Finnish authorities were very interested in ‘hushing
up’ the whole story as Pontecorvo had entered Finland without a visa.78 The FO replied,
So far from wishing to frustrate any Finnish eﬀort to play the matter down, we have in fact an
equal interest with the Finnish authorities in discouraging any further publicity. Interest in the
case appears now to have died down and it would not be to our advantage to do anything that
might tend to revive it.79
During November international events kept the press busy as the Korean War, which
broke out in June 1950, was reaching a stalemate after China had entered the conﬂict.
Moving attention away from other issues, the Korean War also strengthened the pol-
itical alliance between the US and Britain. Careful information management by
government oﬃcials and restraints on access to secret information helped reduce the
impact of the Pontecorvo case signiﬁcantly.80 In their attempts to ‘play down’
Pontecorvo’s defection to protect UK interests in negotiations with the US, British
diplomats appear to have succeeded. Yet other agendas were in play, which not only
threatened the carefully constructed ‘diplomatic ’ version of Pontecorvo’s career, but
also became the basis for the later mythology of the Pontecorvo case.
Play it up! The manufacture of an atom spy story
While British diplomats were playing down Pontecorvo’s defection, some journalists
began speculating on Pontecorvo’s past, claiming that he had been an atom spy between
1943 and 1950. Worried about lax atomic security measures in Britain, they were quick
to bracket Pontecorvo, NunnMay and Fuchs together as ‘atom spies’. Their attempt to
play up the Pontecorvo case never led to proof that secret information was passed. Yet
the Pontecorvo case featured in speculations regarding the presence of Soviet ‘moles’ in
British embassies, research facilities and security services. Indeed, the claim that
Pontecorvo was a spy was used to imply a pressing need to reformMI5 and to introduce
tighter security measures in government research facilities. Archival papers recently
released show that the evidence presented against Pontecorvo was rather ﬂimsy and
77 Two papers were produced to evaluate nuclear reactors for naval propulsion. The paper PSC 65 is still
retained by the UKAEA. PSC 63 is in ‘Power Steering Committee, vol. 2, 1948–49’, AB 12/74.
78 Mr Kellas, Helsinki, to FO, 24 October 1950, in ‘Disappearance of Dr. Bruno Pontecorvo in Finland’,
FO 371/86439.
79 ‘Conﬁdential’, FO to Mr Kellas, 20 October 1950, in ‘Disappearance of Dr. Bruno Pontecorvo in
Finland’, FO 371/86439.
80 More generally, restraints on access to information about nuclear science and policy represented a
crucial factor in shaping post-war UK defence policy. On this see J. Agar and B. Balmer, ‘British scientists
and the Cold War: the Defence Research Policy Committee and information networks’, Historical Studies
in the Physical and Biological Sciences (1998), 28, 210 and 248.
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also that MI5 had been eﬃcient in his security vetting. Ironically, this evidence was
distorted (but never fully disclosed) to prove that the British security services were
ineﬃcient and that Pontecorvo was an atom spy.
Immediately after Pontecorvo’s defection, the FBI claimed that he should not have
been allowed to travel to Italy. They pushed for a tightening of security measures,
depriving scientists even of their civil liberties, as was already happening in the US.81
The FBI also discovered that their records identiﬁed Pontecorvo as having communist
sympathies and that they had communicated this to British intelligence years before.82
However, they did not intend to make a public statement unless forced by the enquiries
of American politicians such as Senator McCarthy.83 Meanwhile, in Britain a secret
Cabinet committee met to elaborate new vetting procedures for personnel working in
government research establishments. Six days after Pontecorvo’s disappearance, new
guidelines for the introduction of the infamous positive vetting or ‘purging procedures ’
(as deﬁned by Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee) were elaborated.84
During this period, the Daily Express science reporter Chapman Pincher used the
Pontecorvo case as a battering ram to campaign against MI5 and to support arguments
for the reformation of atomic security. Between Saturday 21 October and Friday 27
October 1950, Pincher ‘scored’ ﬁve headlines in the newspaper in which he cast more
doubt on the British intelligence agency’s conduct and the Italian scientist’s reliability
(Figure 5).85 The very same day on which the Committee on Positive Vetting was
meeting to launch the purging procedures, Pincher argued that Pontecorvo was never
screened before being involved in secret work in 1943. He also claimed that a mis-
understanding between British intelligence and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
(the military body who had been in charge of Pontecorvo’s vetting in Canada) had
resulted in Pontecorvo not being vetted.86 At this stage, however, the impact of the
Pontecorvo case on security legislation was not yet decisive and on 13 November 1950
81 ‘The State Department even removed the passport of an American atomic scientist who was due to go to
India from his bedroom earlier this year because they had doubts about his reliability’, in ‘Top Secret Cypher
Telegram’ from B.J.S.M., Washington, to Cabinet Oﬃce, 21 October 1950, in ‘Defection to USSR of Dr.
Pontecorvo’, FO 371/84837. Historian Jessica Wang claims that in the 1950s the US loyalty-security system
put suspected American scientists in a state of ‘perpetual jeopardy’ in which ‘old charges were never settled
deﬁnitely’ and ‘once cleared, an individual could confront the same accusation in subsequent loyalty-security
investigations’. Jessica Wang, American Science in an Age of Anxiety: Scientists, Anticommunism and the
Cold War, Chapel Hill, 1999, 256.
82 ‘Top Secret Cypher Telegram’ from B.J.S.M., Washington, to Cabinet Oﬃce, 21 October 1950, in
‘Defection to USSR of Dr. Pontecorvo’, FO 371/84837.
83 ‘Top Secret Cypher Telegram’ from B.J.S.M., Washington, to Cabinet Oﬃce, 23 October 1950, in
‘Defection to USSR of Dr. Pontecorvo’, FO 371/84837.
84 The positive vetting extends the right of security agencies to investigate the private life and political
ideas of government personnel. M. J. Mookerjee, ‘Science, security and the state’, M.Sc. Dissertation
(Manchester, 2002), 54. See also D. Vincent, op. cit. (8), 194–203.
85 In order, ‘Atom man ﬂies away’ (21 October 1950), ‘Atom family in Russia’ (22 October 1950), ‘Atom
man knew atom spy’ (24 October 1950), ‘Atom house searched’ (25 October 1950) and ﬁnally ‘Atomman not
screened’ (27 October 1950).
86 According to Pincher, the Canadians relied upon British clearance, but British intelligence did not vet
Pontecorvo because ‘he was never in Britain before joining the Canadian project’. C. Pincher, ‘Atom man not
screened’ Daily Express, 27 October 1950.
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another government committee, the Cabinet Committee on Subversion, ruled against
any widespread use of positive vetting.87
But in the long run Pincher’s and others’ campaigning had an impact upon legislation
on security measures in Britain, making it similar to that in the US. Pincher’s ‘ full story’
on Pontecorvo appeared in the Daily Express of 26 February 1951. According to
Pincher, Pontecorvo was an ‘active, fanatical communist ’ who was in frequent touch
with Soviet agents from 1943 to 1950, passing them the ‘details about atomic explosive
which his fellow spy Dr. Klaus Fuchs did not know’.88 After his resignation from
Harwell, he was commanded to go to Russia because working at Liverpool University
would have reduced his value as an atom spy.89 On the whole, the depiction of Fuchs,
Pontecorvo and Nunn May as atom spies led to far-reaching revision of atomic security
and the introduction of purging practices within research establishments. In the sum-
mer of 1951 a tripartite conference on security was held in Washington, DC. For US
diplomats the deﬁnitive adoption of new measures of positive vetting in Britain was a
crucial factor in the establishment of nuclear cooperation.90 On 27 August the British
Figure 5. The witch-hunts starts. From theDaily Express, 24 October 1950. OtherDaily Express
splashes included ‘Atom man ﬂies away’ (21 October 1950), ‘Atom house searched’ (25 October
1950), ‘Atommannot screened’ (27October 1950) and ‘Atom family inRussia’ (29October 1950).
87 R. Aldrich, op. cit. (35), 384.
88 C. Pincher, ‘Pontecorvo – full story’, Daily Express, 26 February 1951.
89 C. Pincher, op. cit. (88). According to Pincher, ‘The report on Pontecorvo was detailed and obviously
came from reliable sources but I cannot recall them.’ Private communication, 19 November 2002.
90 According to Lord Portal of the Ministry of Supply collaboration with the Americans was ‘essential
for the proper development of our atomic energy schemes’, 17 August 1951, in CAB 130/20 (quoted in
M. J. Mookerjee, op. cit. (84), 57).
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Cabinet ﬁnally approved the positive vetting measures, which remain in force to this
day in matters relating to national security.91
From the 1950s onwards the literature on atom spies featured Pontecorvo as one of
the protagonists. In 1952 the Times journalist Alan Moorehead, who had followed the
case from the beginning, cast some doubts about Pontecorvo being an atom spy.92
According to Moorehead, if Pontecorvo’s escape to Russia showed his ‘betrayal ’, no
ﬁnal evidence was yet provided of his espionage activity whilst working for the British
atomic programme. Moorehead claimed that the evidence available supported the as-
sumptions both that Pontecorvo was an atom spy and that he was scared by the witch-
hunts.93 But a great help to the witch-hunters’ cause came from a literary work written
in 1952 by the novelist and Civil Service commissioner Charles P. Snow and published
in 1954. The novel The New Men made the British atomic project a subject of ﬁction
featuring many protagonists (under covert names) of the scientiﬁc endeavour.94 Among
others, the scientist Eric Sawbridge featured as an atom spy. Years later, in an interview,
Snow claimed, ‘There was never a Sawbridge case, but several rather related cases. ’95
But certainly some readers did notice that ‘bridge’ was the English translation for the
Italian ‘Ponte’, this being Pontecorvo’s nickname at Harwell, as the newspapers had
widely mentioned.96 Snow’s literary work united three real scientists – Nunn May,
Fuchs and Pontecorvo – in one ﬁctional character. In doing so, it evoked the fear that the
programme to harness nuclear energy in Britain experienced problems because of the
presence of ideologically driven scientists. Their unreliability caused severe disruption to
the scientiﬁc endeavour. And it also allowed atomic secrets to cross the Iron Curtain.
During the ‘hot’ moments of the Cold War, Pontecorvo’s depiction as atom spy was
enriched with new details in order to show that the defence of atomic security was of
paramount importance for the Western states. In that sense, the 1950s Cold War
propaganda was equalled only by that of the 1980s. In two books written in 1981 and
1984 Pincher discovered the FBI notes on Pontecorvo. He argued that they never
reached MI5 because the diplomat Kim Philby suppressed them. In 1949 Philby was
working at the British Embassy in Washington and was later revealed to be a Soviet
agent. According to Pincher, Philby also communicated to Soviet agents that Pontecorvo
had been discovered and these in turn advised Pontecorvo to leave Britain.97 An attempt
91 M. J. Mookerjee, op. cit. (84), 62.
92 The ‘picture of Pontecorvo as a traitor simply does not ﬁt the facts: it would be as rational to believe
that Einstein was a secret baby-killer or that Stalin was, in reality, a fox-hunting gentleman from the shires’.
A. Moorehead, op. cit. (35), 171.
93 ‘The last two theories seem to come nearest to ﬁtting the facts. In the end one is forced to leave the
mystery unsolved and concentrate on other major aspects of the case’. A. Moorehead, op. cit. (35), 198.
94 C. P. Snow, The New Men, London, 1954.
95 John Halperin, C. P. Snow: An Oral Biography, Brighton, 1983, 163.
96 On the other hand, the geneticist J. B. S. Haldane had coined the Scottish nickname ‘Crawbrigg’ (in
English, ‘Crow-bridge’) for his colleague Guido Pontecorvo, Bruno’s brother and geneticist at Glasgow
University. B. L. Cohen, ‘Guido Pontecorvo (‘‘Ponte’’), 1907–1999’, Genetics (2000), 154, 497.
97 C. Pincher, op. cit. (11), 151. The same version appeared also in J. Costello, op. cit. (11), 533. Costello
claims that Pincher received the information from former MI5 high-ranking oﬃcer and author of Spycatcher
Peter Wright in an interview given in October 1980. But Pincher claims that ‘I cannot remember whether or
not Wright and I talked about Pontecorvo but the story which Costello referred to is there in Their Trade is
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was also made to link Pontecorvo to the Soviet spy-ring in Canada. In 1980 H.
Montgomery Hyde claimed that secret documents obtained from the Soviet Embassy
in Ottawa referred to Gini and Golia. Considering that Fuchs confessed to be code-
named Golia, Montgomery deduced that ‘Gini more than likely was Bruno Pontecorvo,
which may appear fantastic, but then Bruno Pontecorvo was in many ways a fantastic
character ’.98 Soviet defectors also contributed to the confusion. In 1990 Oleg
Gordievsky, a former KGB oﬃcial, revealed that Pontecorvo was a spy of the same
importance as Fuchs.99 Yet, in substantiating his claim, he quoted Montgomery Hyde.
Clearly much remains to be clariﬁed about the later historiography of Pontecorvo as an
‘atom spy’, not least because it seems that many of the allegations against Pontecorvo
were put forward with insuﬃcient or ambiguous evidence.
However, new evidence suggests the whole Pontecorvo atom spy story to be a fab-
rication. As I have shown, the FBI claimed in the 1950s that Pontecorvo ‘had commu-
nist sympathies’. This emerged from three reports written by FBI agents as early as
February 1943. At the time the reports were sent to the British security Co-ordination
(BSC), a wartime organization headed by Sir William ‘Little Bill ’ Stephenson, based in
New York and responsible for British security in the western hemisphere.100 BSC was
set up during the war for the operation of intelligence and counter-intelligence,
including the vetting of British personnel working abroad. It was responsible only to the
Security Executive and it was disbanded at the end of the war, when all its records were
also destroyed.101
According to the FBI notes, Pontecorvo’s house in Tulsa had been searched and
‘numerous pamphlets and books on Communism had been found’.102 The FBI sent the
notes to the BSC in New York as the organization was responsible for Pontecorvo’s
vetting. But BSC oﬃcials, who cleared Pontecorvo, never included the information in
his security ﬁle. In November 1950 Roger Hollis, director of section ‘C’ (Security) at
MI5, met Perrin and Strauss and passed them his report on the Pontecorvo case. The
investigation on the FBI notes led him to conclude that ‘ the reports could not have been
seen by the oﬃcer who made the clearance’ and that they were not attached to the
Pontecorvo papers. So MI5 was not responsible for the early mistake. Nor was MI6,
which never saw the notes. Hollis frankly admitted that there must have been ‘some
slip’ in the BSC organization, so that the oﬃcial(s) charged with dispatching the FBI
notes to the man in charge of Pontecorvo’s vetting did not do so. In any case Hollis
Treachery. So he may have assumed that Wright told me as he knew, by then, that he had been the main
source’. Private communication, 19 November 2002.
98 H. Montgomery Hyde, op. cit. (11), 130.
99 C. Andrew and O. Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to
Gorbachev, London, 1990, 312–13.
100 N. West, A Matter of Trust: MI5, 1945–72, London, 1982, 27.
101 BSC had been prominent also in the handling of the Gouzenko case. It is often believed that BSC was a
branch of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, known also as MI6). But BSC was not dependent onMI5 or MI6
and was responsible only to the ‘Security Executive’, the security sub-committee within the Home Defence
Executive (HDE) set up in May 1940 by the Prime Minister W. Churchill to respond to a possible German
invasion. N. West, MI5: British Security Service Operations, 1909–1945, London, 1981, 151 and 154.
102 ‘Secret draft on the Pontecorvo case’ in ‘Defection to USSR of Dr. Pontecorvo’, FO 371/84837.
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advised that ‘the utmost care should be taken to avoid the release of this information’.
The FBI could use the evidence to undermine previous agreements reached between the
directors of the two organizations, J. Edgar Hoover and Percy Sillitoe, according to
which ‘neither organisation would say anything about the other’s actions without
consultation and agreement ’.103 With regard to Canadian intelligence, Hollis claimed
that they had indeed vetted Pontecorvo and that in December 1946 they ‘knew nothing
to his detriment’.104
The FBI’s claims of lax security measures on the grounds of their early notes were
rather exaggerated. Whatever the FBI had discovered in 1943 was not relevant because
American intelligence in 1946 had had a prominent role in the Canadian spy-ring
operation.105 That operation had produced the arrest of Nunn May, prompted the early
investigation of Fuchs, and more generally led to the thorough investigation of all the
scientiﬁc personnel working in Canada. If Pontecorvo was in the same spy-ring, then
the FBI should have investigated his position in 1946 following the discovery of com-
promising evidence. But it did not do so, nor did it disclose at the time the early notes on
the search in Tulsa. Even General Leslie Groves, who had been a ‘key ﬁgure in
prompting the Gouzenko enquiry’, and a manager obsessed with security, had raised no
objection to Pontecorvo’s departure for Europe shortly after Nunn May’s arrest.106
Either he was certain of his loyalty or at least careful enough to promote his secret
shadowing, which eventually came out with no proof of spying activity. In any case it is
sensible to assume that in 1950 the FBI’s early notes were used instrumentally to push
indirectly the reformation of atomic security in Britain rather than in the real belief that
Pontecorvo was an atom spy.
Moreover, the allegations about Pontecorvo had originated from rather ﬂimsy evi-
dence. The FBI search had led only to the ﬁnding of numerous books and pamphlets on
communism. In the media frenzy that followed the witch-hunts, this ﬂimsy evidence
had become the unjustiﬁed allegation that Pontecorvo, because communist, was in
touch with Soviet agents. Moreover, against the claim put forward by many who
sought to demonstrate that Pontecorvo was an atom spy, the FBI notes had failed to
reach the British services not because they were suppressed by Kim Philby, but just
because they had been sent to another intelligence body. Finally, the FBI notes were sent
in 1943 and not in 1949. This evidence shows also that in the 1950s as well as in the
1980s Pincher and others built up their story by mixing facts and hypothetical as-
sumptions. If the early allegation about contacts between Pontecorvo and Soviet agents
were Pincher’s brainchild, the later allegations about the FBI sending documents to
British security were true and ‘leaked’ from oﬃcial security sources (British or
American) but were eventually distorted. Ironically, an early public disclosure of MI5
documents relating to the Pontecorvo case would have avoided all these speculations.
103 For this reason the letter containing details on the FBI notes was classiﬁed ‘Secret and Guard’.
Mr Perrin to R. Makins, 9 November 1950, in ‘Defection to USSR of Dr. Pontecorvo’, FO 371/84837.
104 ‘Secret draft on the Pontecorvo case’ in ‘Defection to USSR of Dr. Pontecorvo’, FO 371/84837.
105 R. Aldrich, op. cit. (35), 105.
106 See note 35, above. Quote from R. Aldrich, op. cit. (35), 106.
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Clearly, British diplomats involved in sensitive UK–US nuclear negotiations were not
the only actors whowished to play down the Pontecorvo case. Security oﬃcials, too, had
much to lose from uncontrolled public discussion of the case. As Chapman Pincher’s
critique of British security showed, the Pontecorvo case could be understood and used
in many diﬀerent ways. However, ‘continued silence’ on the issue by intelligence
oﬃcers, together with uncontrolled speculation by journalists and spy-storytellers,
granted MI5 extended power of control and vetting over scientiﬁc personnel. So, in-
directly, for the security services this silence had a beneﬁcial and unexpected pay-oﬀ.
Conclusions: a reappraisal of the Pontecorvo case
In 1955, during a press conference from the Institute of Nuclear Research in Dubna
where he was now working, Pontecorvo claimed that he had left Britain as a conse-
quence of the witch-hunts and the pressure put on him by security services during
vetting. He stressed that he never contributed to the Soviet weapons programme al-
though he advised Soviet nuclear experts on matters concerned with atomic energy.107
He continued working in Russia and visited Italy in the early 1980s. Now involved in
disarmament, he campaigned within international scientiﬁc organizations against the
proliferation of nuclear weapons. Even if Pontecorvo confessed to have contributed to
the Soviet atomic energy programme, the question of what contribution he made is
unfortunately still unanswered. Pontecorvo’s defection to the USSR was probably far
more signiﬁcant than their own many spying activities because Pontecorvo’s expertise
in geophysical prospecting dealt with the limiting factor in the Soviet programme – the
shortage of uranium supply – on which he could provide some technical help. More-
over, Pontecorvo’s defection could provide the Soviets with tacit knowledge and
expertise to be used more eﬀectively than single documentary pieces of nuclear infor-
mation. Certainly the documentary evidence available to historians has clariﬁed only
Pontecorvo’s contribution to the advancement of Soviet particle physics, whilst archival
work is still needed to understand in what way, as Pontecorvo claimed, he contributed
to the Soviet atomic energy programme.108
If the 1943 FBI notes had been included in Pontecorvo’s UK security ﬁle, then his
outstanding contributions to the British nuclear programme, documented in this paper,
would never have occurred. The ﬂimsy evidence about the FBI search would have been
used to exclude Pontecorvo from the programme. Moving across constructed barriers
between secret and open research, Pontecorvo had developed important research in the
areas of pile physics and geophysical prospecting that helped solve the problems of
mapping uranium ores and of transforming uranium in ﬁssile material in nuclear piles.
107 Pontecorvo was deprived of his British citizenship according to the British Nationality Act (1948). Via
diplomatic means, he communicated to British authorities that he considered it ‘necessary to emphasise the
fact that I have not shown any elements of disloyalty or unfriendliness towards the British people and that
I still entertain the highest feeling for them’. B. Pontecorvo, ‘Letter to Comrade Slavin, USSR Ministry of
Foreign Aﬀairs’, 20 April 1955, in ‘Citizens deprived of citizenship, including Bruno Pontecorvo’, FO 372/
7390.
108 Pontecorvo’s nuclear research in the USSR is examined by V. P. Dzheporov, ‘The genius of Bruno
Pontecorvo’, in S. M. Bilenky et al., op. cit. (10), 487–93 and by several others in the same collection.
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Being primarily involved in cosmic ray research, Pontecorvo used the multifaceted
character of nuclear science and technology to pass from cosmic rays to geophysical
prospecting and from isotope production to nuclear pile design, using similar meth-
odologies, practices and techniques. This fact reminds us that no single unique secret
obstructs a country from achieving nuclear weapons, but that many diﬀerent aspects of
atomic knowledge and experimental practices are needed for the completion of a
nuclear programme.
The purges that hit government research laboratories and aﬀected around two hun-
dred foreign and British workers between the 1950s and the 1980s originated from the
widespread belief that in Britain there were three atom spies and that one of them was
Bruno Pontecorvo. The ‘gap’ between what the public believed about Pontecorvo and
what was known by a few security oﬃcials facilitated the operation. The manipulation
of reports on Pontecorvo’s vetting procedures meant that no objections were raised to
the adoption of measures of positive vetting. Whether the manipulation originated in
the FBI or in MI5, it is now evident that a distortion occurred.
The assessment conducted on the Pontecorvo case reﬂected the internal agendas of
the British diplomatic and security services rather than an attempt to clarify the real
threat represented by Pontecorvo’s defection. While the British public believed that its
governors were assessing the dimensions of this threat, it was actually being deceived
about its signiﬁcance. The fact that in the past Pontecorvo had been moving between
the boundaries of secret and open research was now used to claim that because he was
primarily concerned with open research he had limited access to atomic secrets. Ironi-
cally, the attempt to protect UK interests in the tripartite negotiations failed because
new prospecting instrumentation developed by Americans helped discover high-grade
ores in the Athabaska region in Canada. Thus US diplomats decided to delay further the
UK–US negotiations in the wake of an increased supply of uranium. The explosion of
the ﬁrst British atomic bomb in October 1952 left these negotiations in their original
state – ‘a state of non-existence’.109 The Pontecorvo case suggests that assessing the
threat deriving from the spreading of nuclear information in the presence of contingent
agendas may undermine its outcome. The presence of international agreements (and
connected economic interests) and the establishment of preferential political partner-
ships are factors that lead to the manipulation of evidence gathered in order to play
down (or play up) their signiﬁcance and thus assess them accordingly.
Atomic security assessments, combined with the general fear that security in relation
to scientiﬁc knowledge is too lax, impact upon the liberties of scientists, whether
working in government research facilities or universities. Manipulating assessments led
to new legislation that may encroach on researchers’ freedom and thus limit their
rights. Without this fear, new laws restricting liberties within research laboratories
would encounter criticism and protest within and without the government. On the
whole, the construction of an ‘enemy within’ is a powerful lubricant in the machinery
of government, because it grants that a new security regulation, restricting the liberty of
researchers, becomes generally accepted.
109 S. H. Paul, op. cit. (64), 198.
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